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ABSTRACT
This paper estimates a structural model of family retirement using U.S. data from the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) and from the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women. Estimates using
the HRS benefit from having, for each spouse, earnings histories provided by the respondent and the
Social Security Administration, and employer provided pension plan descriptions. We find that a measure
of how much each spouse values being able to spend time in retirement with the other accounts for a good
portion of the apparent interdependence of the retirement decisions of husbands and wives. When we
include this measure, the simulations almost double the frequency of predicted joint retirements. Once
estimated, we use the model to investigate the labor supply effects of alternative social security policies,
examining the effect of dividing credit for earnings evenly between spouses, or of basing social security
benefits on the amounts accumulated in private accounts. Both policies change the relative importance
of spouse and survivor social security benefits within the household and both raise the relative reward to
work later in the life cycle. The incentives created are modest, and retirement responds accordingly.
Nevertheless, at some ages, such as 65, there may be as much as a 6 percent increase in the old age work
force under privatized accounts.
Alan L. Gustman Thomas L. Steinmeier
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Dartmouth College Texas Tech University
Hanover, NH 03755 Lubbock, TX 79409
and NBER thomas.steinmeier@ttu.edu
alan.l.gustman@dartmouth.edu1For example, the increase in the value of the social security benefits that accrues to the
family from the work of one spouse depends on the work history and employment of the other
spouse (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001b).  We analyze the effects of interactions within the
social security system and some alternative structures in Section VIII.
2Among the studies focusing on the individual’s retirement decision are: Burtless and
Moffitt (1984), Fields and Mitchell (1984), Gustman and Steinmeier (1986a and b), Stock and
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I.  Introduction
This paper estimates a structural model of family retirement using U.S. data from the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  It provides further insight into household retirement
decision making and the reasons for interdependence in the retirement decisions of each spouse. 
Improvements in HRS data and matched employer provided pension histories allow more precise
identification of key parameters governing interdependent behavior within the household. Once
estimated, we use the model to investigate the labor supply effects of alternative social security
policies, examining the effect of dividing credit for earnings evenly between spouses, or of
basing social security benefits on the amounts accumulated in private accounts. 
There are a number of reasons why economists are interested in the process of retirement
decision making within the family.  Most fundamentally, it is not possible to understand the
retirement decision of one spouse without considering the behavior of the other.  Aspects of
consumption are joint and so is family wealth.  The valuation of one’s own leisure may depend
on the amount of the spouse’s leisure.  Moreover, the reward to work for one spouse may depend
on the labor market activities and work history of the other.
1  More generally, analysis of joint
retirement decisions may further our understanding of other dimensions of behavior within and
by the family unit.  
Yet much of the research on retirement behavior has focused on the individual.
2  To theWise (1987), Berkovec and Stern (1991) and Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1990, 1992, 1994,
1996).  A few studies, such as Pozzebon and Mitchell (1989), examine the retirement decisions
of both spouses together.  Most, such as recent examples by Coile (1999) and Johnson and
Favreault (2001), are reduced form.  For a survey, see Lundberg (1999).  
3Typically, a defined benefit pension is a plan that provides a benefit based on the length
of tenure on the job, annual earnings in the last few or highest few years of work, and the chosen
age of retirement.  At normal retirement age, a plan might provide a benefit equal to say 1.5
percent of the average of last three years of earnings times years of service.  Most often, such
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extent that important interactions between spouses have been ignored, the retirement decision
will be misunderstood, and so will the roles played by public policies and private retirement
programs.
One reason retirement studies may have focused on individuals rather than families is
that estimation of many models of family behavior may be clouded by a lack of identifying
instruments.  Fortunately, however, in the case of the retirement decision, the reward structure is
shaped not only by the wage, but by the accrual rates in the values of the pension and social
security.  Thus each spouse may face a sharply different retirement incentive.  As a result, it is
easier to identify the elements fostering interdependence in the family’s retirement decision
making than it is to identify the interactions governing other decisions reached within the family. 
Nevertheless, an increase in our understanding of how each spouse’s retirement decision
interacts with the other’s will promote a clearer understanding of other decisions made within the
household, including bargaining between spouses in the course of household production, saving
and even the formation and break up of the household.
The location and size of each spike in the pension benefit accrual profile depends
idiosyncratically on the date of hire and age at hire, and varies among pension plans, and thus
differs between spouses.
3  Spikes in accrual profiles for defined benefit plans may be very large,plans allow individuals to retire early, but only if they have met tenure and age requirements. 
Moreover, these plans often reduce benefits for those retiring at the early retirement age, but not
on an actuarially fair basis.  The effect of such reductions is to create a spike in the pension
accrual profile at the early retirement age.  Many such plans also provide other incentives to
retire early, further enhancing the size of the spike.  In contrast, a defined contribution plan
provides benefits based on contributions to an account, by the employer and perhaps also by the
employee.  The reward structure is much smoother.  Although some DC plans offer special early
retirement enhancements, most DC plans do not, and thus do not generate a spike in the benefit
accrual profile.  Gustman and Steinmeier (1989) discuss the relevant literature and the factors
determining the shape of the benefit accrual profile in the case of covered workers surveyed by
the Survey of Consumer Finances.  Gustman and Steinmeier (2000c) present analogous results
using pension data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women and the Health and
Retirement Study.
4Consider some of the major changes in defined benefit pensions that have occurred over
the work life of those cohorts now approaching retirement.  The size of the spike associated with
early retirement has increased.  There has been a sharp decline in the age of eligibility for early
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equaling or exceeding the wage for working another year.  In contrast to wages and other
benefits that are closely related to the wage, which accrue relatively smoothly over time, the
sharp spikes in pension accruals break the close relationship between the substitution and wealth
effects, and hence facilitate identification of these effects.  If a person responds strongly to
economic rewards, he or she is unlikely to retire in the few years before becoming eligible for an
early retirement benefit, at least in the absence of a strong outside influence such as a bout of ill
health. 
Further aiding identification, there is reason to believe the incentives created by pensions
and social security are truly exogenous to the individual decision maker.  Those with pensions
have only limited turnover from their jobs (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1993, 1995).  Accordingly,
by the time they retire, pension covered workers typically have a long tenure.  There have been
many large changes in pensions during the course of the work lives of those pension covered
workers in the U.S. who are now approaching retirement.
4  Thus for those who are now within aretirement, falling eight years between the late 1960s and the early 1980s (Anderson, Gustman
and Steinmeier, 1999).  Today, three fourths of HRS respondents with a defined benefit plan are
eligible for an early retirement benefit by age 55 (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000c). There also
have been analogous changes in the normal retirement age.  In addition, there has been the rise
of the 401(k) plan, with the predominant plan type shifting from defined benefit to defined
contribution (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1992, 2000b).  
5For a contrasting view arguing that selection into pension plans is related to the
propensity to save and to leisure preference, see Ippolito (1998).
6In related studies, we are extending this work to include the effects of imperfect capital
markets.  These studies are being conducted separately for individuals and married couples.  We
also are dropping the assumption of perfect foresight, using dynamic programming models to
allow for unforeseen disturbances in each period.
4
decade of retirement age, the incentives from pensions in place at the time of retirement are very
different from what they were when they first accepted their jobs.  Having made their decisions
to join their firms decades earlier, these strong trends mean they could not foresee what their
pensions would look like at the time they were hired.  The implication is that causality does not
run from leisure preference to the opportunity set, but from the pension to retirement choice
5.
Analogously, the incentives from social security are largely exogenous to the decision making of
the family.
In an earlier study (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000a), we used respondent self reports
describing their pension plans to estimate a structural model in which the decisions of the two
spouses were combined in a possibly non-cooperative bargaining model of retirement.
6 There is
an important concern about this earlier work.  At the time we wrote that paper, there was no
longitudinal survey that combined information on work history and current work effort with
information from respondents’ employers describing the pension plans that they offered.  For
those covered by defined benefit plans, we had to rely on the respondent’s description as to the
location and size of the early retirement spike.  We also had to impute benefits and the accrual7This is also a major problem because reported plan type is used in the HRS and other
surveys to determine whether the respondent is asked questions about the characteristics of a
defined benefit plan or a defined contribution plan.  
8More specifically the respondent to the NLS-MW is the woman in the household.  There
is an excellent earnings history, based on interviews from 1967 to the last survey, available for
the woman.  She also reports, but only incompletely, and for much of the period retrospectively,
on the labor market activities and earnings of her spouse.  Another problem with the NLS-MW
data is that although we update the results based on the NLS-MW to incorporate employer
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spike using a generic formula and information on average actuarial adjustments in typical plans. 
Available evidence now establishes that respondents do a poor job of reporting the key pieces of
information necessary to locate and determine the size of spikes in their pension accrual profile
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001a, 2002).  Indeed, respondents even report plan type with
considerable error (Mitchell, 1988; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1989).
7 
The present paper takes advantage of new longitudinal surveys that link employer
provided pension plan descriptions with panel data following the household through the
retirement decision.  These data provide a precise picture of the location and size of the spikes in
the accrual profiles of defined benefit pensions, while allowing retirement behavior to be
recorded in a timely fashion in the relevant wave following retirement.  We rely primarily on the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  However, later in the analysis we also use data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women (NLS-MW), which now includes employer
provided pension plan descriptions.  Despite the availability of employer provided pension data,
certain features of the NLS-MW make it less satisfactory for estimating a model of joint
retirement behavior than the data from the HRS.  A major shortcoming is that the husband’s
work history is reported by the wife, with most of the husband’s work history also reported
retrospectively
8.  However, the estimates based on the NLS-MW help to build a bridge to theprovided plan descriptions, pension plan descriptions were matched in the NLS-MW after a three
year delay that greatly reduces the number of successful matches.  In contrast, the Health and
Retirement Study interviews each spouse separately, asking individually about their own labor
market activities, including current and previous work. Moreover, the match process is more
contemporaneous.  There is also a further advantage to the HRS.  It provides earnings records
from the Social Security Administration, permitting more precise measurement of the earnings
history of each spouse. Thus the HRS data allow more precise identification of parameters for
each spouse within the structural model.  
9A caveat should be noted.  Because our analysis applies only to couples, it does not
project the effects that private accounts would have on the behavior of single individuals.
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findings from our earlier study.  
Once estimated, the model is used to investigates three potential channels which might
generate the elevated level of instances in which the spouses retire at around the same time.  The
estimation also is extended to incorporate information on the preferences of each spouse
regarding the value of time spent together.  
A joint retirement model is suitable for analyzing the effects of alternative social security
policies regarding the distribution of spouse and survivor benefits.  If spouses coordinate their
retirement, then policies modifying the reward to each spouse will have effects beyond those
suggested by the incentives they create for each individual.  The effects of social security
policies will be filtered through the household decision making process, suggesting that the
impact of these policies can be understood only if they are analyzed with a model of family
retirement decision making.  In a final section we simulate the effects of adopting individual
social security accounts and benefit splitting, policies that would change the distribution of
social security benefits within the household as well as the time profile of the reward to work.
9 
II.  Overview of the Model
We estimate a joint retirement model that mixes noncooperation with some elements of10This model is developed in Gustman and Steinmeier (2000a).  A more complete
description can be found there. 
11Primarily to keep the model simple enough to estimate, part-time work is ignored and
retirement is considered to be an absorbing state; once retired, one cannot return to work. 
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cooperation, and selfish utility maximization with joint utility maximization.
10  The two spouses
share household consumption.  They do not consume goods according to own income.  For each
spouse, utility is a function of own leisure, which in part may be determined by spouse’s leisure,
and household consumption.  Although each spouse acts to maximize own utility, at a given
level of own utility, each would choose any feasible alternative that improves their spouse’s
utility. 
The utility functions for the two spouses are specified symmetrically.  The subscript or
superscript  h  signifies a variable that pertains to the husband;  w  signifies a variable pertaining
to the wife.  
For the husband we have: 
For the wife, the utility function is:
Ct  is family consumption, and  L
h
t  and  L
w
t  are the leisure of the husband and wife.   Lt  is a
dichotomous variable taking on a value of  0  if the individual is working and  1  if retired at time 
t.
11   Each individual lives  T  years, and  t  is time since household formation.  The terms12The opportunity set does not include employer provided health insurance while working
or retiree health insurance.  In this type of model, which assumes perfect capital and insurance
markets, on the job and retiree health insurance have little effect on retirement incentives. 
Insurance provided on the job has the same effect as an increase in the wage.  However, the
wage level has little effect on retirement.  After age 65 retiree health insurance consists of
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  and     determine the relative values of retirement to the husband
and wife.   Xt  is a vector of variables that includes a constant term, age, and health.   ,  is an
individual fixed effect, where higher values of  ,  indicate higher values of retirement to the
individual.  As age increases, so does the value of leisure.  When the value of retirement
outweighs the value of the wages from working, the individual retires. 
Each spouse’s utility may be linked to the other’s through three possible channels.  Most
directly, consumption is family consumption, financed by a joint budget constraint which is
described below.  In addition, the spouse’s utility appears in the exponential expression affecting
the value of one’s own leisure.  Lastly, the fixed effects in their respective utility functions may
be correlated for husbands and wives.  In an extension below, we also include a direct measure
of how each spouse values the opportunity to share leisure with the other.
Both the husband and wife maximize their respective utility functions subject to the
constraint that lifetime family consumption cannot exceed family income:
In this budget constraint, both consumption and wages are expressed in real terms, and  d  is the
real interest rate.  W
h
t  and  W
w
t  are the husband's and wife's compensation amounts when
employed.  In addition to wages, compensation includes annual accruals to the present values of
pensions and social security, due both to own and spouse and survivor benefits.
12 medigap insurance.  It has a low present value and thus has little effect on retirement behavior
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 1994, 2000b).  In contrast, Rust and Phalen (1997) find that health
insurance is an important determinant of retirement behavior.  However, they assume that the
market for private health insurance is not working, and that those who are not seen to have
purchased health insurance on the private market are unable to do so.  There is no mechanism in
their model for people to decide not to purchase health insurance in the private market because
they are willing to self insure rather than pay the premium.  This means that anyone who is still
working in their study is assumed to be unable to purchase retiree health insurance in the private
market, creating an artificial relationship between employment and availability of health
insurance coverage.  Other studies that do not rely on the assumption of a perfect insurance
market nevertheless find only a small influence of retiree health insurance on retirement (Blau
and Gilleskie, 2001; French and Jones, 2001).
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The sequence of decisions is straightforward.  Because there is a common consumption
parameter  ",  both spouses can agree on how to spend  a given amount of lifetime family
income.  Each spouse then chooses own labor supply to maximize his or her own utility function. 
In choosing own labor supply, we assume that each spouse knows the leisure preferences of the
other, and so bases their choice of own labor supply on the labor supply that the other spouse
will choose as a result.  With each spouse's labor supply entering the utility function of the other
spouse, there is the possibility of two or more Nash equilibria.  Should there be more than one
Nash equilibrium, the one that is advantageous to both spouses will be chosen.  When the
spouses prefer different Nash equilibria, we assume that the spouse who retires first chooses the
retirement date which is advantageous to that spouse, taking into account the retirement date that
the second spouse will subsequently choose.  There is no uncertainty in the model.  Since both
spouses know each others’ preferences from the start, consumption and labor supply decisions
are planned at the beginning of the life cycle with perfect foresight.
Details to the solution of the model are presented in our earlier paper.  For family  i,  let 
Si(", $h, $w, (h, (w )  be the set of values of  ,h  and   ,w  in the utility maximization problem13In a similar fashion, if either spouse begins to collect social security disability insurance
benefits, the observation is treated as right censored at the time the disability benefits begin. 
This effectively means that for such couples, the last survey used in determining  Si  is the survey
before the disability payments start.
14The HRS is funded primarily by the National Institute on Aging, with additional
support from the Social Security Administration and others.
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which are consistent with retirement between the observed dates.  If the retirement age for either
spouse is not observed within the survey period (1992-2000), the set will not be bounded; this
effectively is how the estimation procedure accommodates cases where a respondent has already
retired before the survey starts or still has not retired when last observed.
13  Note that the
boundaries of the set depend on the values of the utility function parameters.  Further suppose





w, D),  where F
2
h  and  F
2
w  are the variances of  ,w  and  ,h,  and  D  is the correlation.  Using
this notation, the log-likelihood function is
The integrals in the log-likelihood function are evaluated with a standard routine for cumulative
joint probabilities of bivariate normal distributions.  The likelihood function is maximized using
a standard maximization routine, and standard errors for the estimates are calculated by the
Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman method.
III.  The Data
Our central focus is on results using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
14  These
results pertain to couples with a long term marriage, where each spouse also has a long term15If we were to include those who changed spouses after age 35, it would be necessary to
determine how much wealth each spouse brought into the marriage, how they split obligations to
children and facts that are not available in the HRS data.
16We use fairly liberal criterion in defining who is a career worker. Career workers are
those who have worked full-time (30 hours or more) more than 50% of the time between age 40
(or 1982, whichever came earlier) and the last year of observed full-time work, as determined by
the jobs in the job history and the full-time work answers in wave 3.  The last year of full-time
work must be no earlier than age 50, or if the worker was not 50 in 1992, he or she must have
been working full-time in 1992.  This was cross-checked with the social security records if those
were available; a worker would not be considered to be a career worker if he or she had zero
social security earnings in more than 50% of the years in the above-mentioned interval, unless
the individual indicated that they worked on either government jobs or non-social security jobs. 
Also, an individual would always be considered to be a career worker if the social security
earnings record indicated that he/she earned at least 60% of the real wages earned in the final
full-time job for more than 50% of the years in the interval, even if the job history did not
indicate enough years.  This should catch instances of a series of short jobs which would be
missed in the job history.
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commitment to the labor market.  Table 1 describes the derivation of the sample.  The HRS has
4767 couples for whom both spouses completed interviews in 1992.  Of these, 1424 couples had
at least one partner who had changed spouses, either through divorce or widowhood, after age
35, and thus do not qualify as long-term marriages.
15  This means that approximately 30% of the
couples are deleted because a lifetime planning model is probably not appropriate.  More
importantly, of those couples with a long term marriage, about 56% were dropped because one
spouse was not a career worker. Specifically, 1876 couples out of 3343 did not meet the criteria
for both spouses to be career workers.
16 
Next we face a trade-off between bias due to missing data and bias due to
instrumentation.  In a nonlinear model like ours, the choice is fairly clear:  include only
observations for which the required data are available.  To illustrate, in our nonlinear model,
certain types of incorrect information, such as the wrong date for the location of the spike in the17The pension plan descriptions are missing disproportionately for employees in small
firms, college grads, those with more than $100,000 in assets, long tenure workers, those in
manufacturing and management, those earning more than $100,000 per year, those with defined
contribution plans only, those with DB plans paying low benefits, and those with $25,000 to
$100,000 in DC plans.  Regressions are reported in Gustman and Steinmeier (2002).
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pension accrual profile due to early retirement provisions, will create a severe bias.  Suppose that
the detailed description of a defined benefit pension plan is missing, and we impute a value for
the date of eligibility for early retirement benefits that is after the actual date of eligibility. 
Further suppose the person retired at the time he became eligible under his actual plan.  In this
circumstance, the model will find the respondent leaving just before becoming eligible for the
(imputed) early retirement eligibility date.  Consequently, the estimation will indicate that the
person is not at all sensitive to economic incentives, since the foregone benefit accrual might
have amounted to a year’s pay or more from working for an additional few weeks or months. 
However, the error is not symmetric: if the imputed early retirement date is too low and the
respondent retires at a later date, we would not necessarily conclude that the respondent is highly
sensitive to economic incentives.  By confining the estimation to those observations where a full
set of information is available, we avoid this very strong bias that may result from imputation. 
That is why we have decided to omit observations for which we do not have an exact description
of the pension, and to extend this choice to estimate findings only for the portion of the sample
for which a complete data set is available. 
Of the 1467 couples who are long-term families of career workers, data problems with
the respondent reduce the number of couples by about a half (143 + 24 + 116 + 7 + 462 = 752;
752/1467 = 0.51).  Of this decline in the sample, about 61 percent of the loss is due to missing
pension data (462/752).
17  From the perspective of the entire sample, about two thirds of these18There are two other minor yet not completely non-trivial deletions.  The first is
instances where the number of full-time years is ambiguous.  These are primarily cases where
the social security record is missing and either the respondent was not interviewed at wave 3 or
the wave 3 information about full-time years is missing. The second reason is instances where
the age in one survey was greater than or equal to the age reported in a subsequent survey.  This
calls into question which age is correct and throws into doubt whether we have the correct age
for the timing of retirement.
19Thus in this first paper using NLS-MW data, the pension is assumed to be a simple DB
plan, where the benefit is the product of a generosity coefficient times years of service times
final salary.  The generosity coefficient (the term in the benefit formula determining the
replacement rate) is calculated from the respondent’s report of expected pension benefits, or if
expected pension benefits are not reported, a figure of 1.6 percent is used, which is the median
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older workers have pensions, and the provider profile is missing for about a third of them,
meaning that over a fifth of these workers are dropped because of a missing pension.  Again
assuming relatively little duplication of missing pensions within a family, this means that almost
40% of two-worker families would be dropped for this reason.  As seen in Table 1, in the end the
sample used in the estimation amounts to 715 couples and represents not quite half of the
original couples with career jobs and a long term marriage.
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We are going to compare the findings from the HRS with results from two studies that we
undertook with data from the NLS Mature Women’s Survey (NLS-MW).  The first, Gustman
and Steinmeier (2000a), used data  through the 1989 wave.  The women in the NLS-MW were
born between 1923 and 1937 and thus were 52 to 66 years old in 1989.  Pension characteristics
used in that analysis were self reported.  Plan descriptions were not available at that time from
the respondents’ employers.  We know from other work (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier, 1989,
2000a) that there are substantial errors in pension self reports.  In addition, the respondent can
provide only a brief list of determinants of pension benefits.  Without a detailed description of
the pension from the firm, we had to apply population averages for some pension plan features.
19 for those plans for which we did have information.  We assumed that all pensions reduce benefits
from the age of normal retirement by 4.9 percent per year, a figure found in earlier work by
Hatch et al. (1981).  
20The later study was conducted for the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1998).  Results from this study have not been published
elsewhere.
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 After all exclusions, there were 564 couples in the NLS-MW sample using self reported
pension incentives.
Bridging the gap between our earlier study and the present one, we have an updated
version of our earlier study.
20   The later study uses the NLS-MW data through 1992 rather than
1989.  Importantly, the later study does include information from employer provided pension
plan descriptions. The pension summary plan descriptions were collected from employers after
the 1989 survey, but there was a delay that adversely affected the rate at which employer plan
descriptions could be successfully matched with the employer names provided by respondents. 
Moreover, a number of the husbands had retired by 1989.  Although it was possible to match
some employer provided pension plan descriptions, they were available for only one fifth of the
husbands with a pension.  In contrast, pension plan descriptions from current or last jobs are
available for roughly two thirds of HRS respondents who report pensions on those jobs. 
There also are other problems with the NLS-MW data, creating problems for both of our
studies based on the NLS-MW data.  Because the NLS-MW was a study of women, there was
very limited information collected about the employment and earnings of the husband. 
Moreover, a full work history is available for about 70 percent of the respondents to the HRS in
the form of the social security earnings history.  In contrast, although the NLS-MW data
provides an extensive work history for wives, the work history for husbands is badly incomplete,21Since the initial age of respondents was 30 to 44 in 1967, women who dropped out in
the early years of the survey did so before reaching retirement age, and hence these women
would not shed much light on a retirement analysis in any case.
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and in the end relies on retrospective data rather than panel data recorded contemporaneously, or
administrative data.  Indeed, in the NLS-MW, key information about the husband’s pension was
collected from the wife, including the self reported pension information used in our first study,
and the employer names which we rely on when matching an employer provided pension plan
description with an interview record for the husband.
Because these problems undermined our ability to match employer provided plan
descriptions in the NLS-MW, especially for husbands, we used a different procedure in our
second NLS-MW study than we followed when using HRS data.  Even though pension data were
available for the 1992 NLS-MW sample, in cases of missing pension descriptions, we used the
early and normal retirement dates reported on the respondent survey (by the wife for her own
and for her husband’s pension).  From this we constructed the pension accrual profiles using the
generosity and early retirement reduction factors calculated as the means of employer provided
pensions in the same industry, occupation, and earnings category.  The idea was to use as many
observations as possible in the smaller NLS-MW sample by anchoring the pensions on the
self-reported early and normal retirement ages and imputing the generosity and reduction factors
as the averages for pensions in similar jobs.  However, the fact that we employed imputation
procedures for the pensions in the NLS-MW means that estimates of the responsiveness to
economic incentives are probably understated in these results.
The NLS-MW contains 2,084 women who were married at the beginning of the survey
and who participated in each of the surveys through 1992.
21   Of these, in our second study using22Career workers refer to those with substantial full-time work experience (at least three
consecutive surveys of work after age 40 and at least one-half of the surveys before the last
survey with full-time work for women, or at least two-thirds of the surveys before the last survey
with full-time work for men), and at least one survey of full-time work after age 50.  Full-time
work means at least 25 hours of work per week for women or at least 1250 hours per year for
men, for whom usual weekly hours are not always available.  Using a 35 hour per week or 1500
hour per year definition results in slightly higher joint retirement, but at a cost of about 20
percent of the sample.
16
NLS-MW data there are 499 couples in the sample.
22 
IV.  Descriptive Analysis
Tables 2 and 3 provide some idea as to the timing of retirement of husbands and wives
within the HRS sample.  By comparing the two parts of each table, we can determine the
similarity between the sample used in our later analysis, and the full sample including
observations with missing data.  Part A of each table is based two-career couples in long-term
marriages, while part B of each table excludes couples for whom we are missing information
critical to calculating the budget constraint.  It is the sample in part B of each table that is
estimated and analyzed in later in the paper.  
Among those in Table 2A who meet the definition of couples with a lifetime commitment
to the labor market, 514 wives and 476 husbands retire after the last wave of the survey.  In
addition, 235 wives and 284 husbands retired before the first wave of the survey.  With 2,934
total wives and husbands in the sample in Table 2A (1,467 couples), that leaves 1,425
individuals, or 48.6% of the original sample of career workers married only to their current
spouses, who retired in waves 2, 3, 4, or 5 of the survey.  Summing the observations along the
diagonal, for 607 out of 1467 couples, or 41.4 percent of the observations, the husband and wife
both retired in the same period.17
In Table 2B there are 715 couples.  Thus approximately half of the couples in Table 2A
will be lost for not having economic information available.  Among the sample with all the
information required for estimation of our structural model available, 662 out of 1,430, or 46.3
percent, retired in waves 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the survey.  Again summing along the diagonal, for the
sample with full economic information available, 290 out of 715 couples, or 40.6 percent of
couples, had the husband and wife both retire in the same period, very close to the 41.4 percent
of the sample found for Table 2A.
Table 3 examines the patterns of retirement among HRS couples, according to their age
differences.  Among the 435 couples in Table 3A, which includes observations whether budget
constraint variables are available or not, the wife is older than the husband in only 49 of them, or
in 11.3% of the cases.  Similarly, among the 192 couples in Table 3B, which excludes
observations with budget constraint variables missing, the wife is older than the husband in 24 of
them, or in 12.5% of the cases.  In an additional 36 households in Table 3A, the wife and
husband are the same age.  So in more than three quarters of the households in both samples, the
husband is older than the wife.  Nevertheless, in Table 3A the median difference in time of
retirement is zero, with 205 couples (47 percent of couples) with spouses who retire within the
same year.  Similarly, the median difference in Table 3B is zero, with 86 couples (45 percent of
couples) with spouses who retire in the same year.  Moreover, the distributions of differences in
retirement age are symmetric around zero in the two tables.  In both samples, about three times
as many couples retire in the same survey as found with the husband retiring one survey later
than the wife, and three times as many couples retire in the same survey as are found with the
husband retiring one survey earlier than the wife.  This evidence suggests the two samples, those18
with complete data and the full sample which also includes observations with missing data, are
similar.  These findings are also strong evidence of coordination of retirement among the two
career couples in the HRS who have already retired. 
The data in Table 3 do not describe the patterns of retirement that will ultimately be
observed, however, since the couples in Table 3 are selected to include those who retired by the
fifth wave of the survey, and thus who have a stronger preference for retirement.  As indicated in
Section II, the estimation procedure does not censor the sample if either spouse has yet to retire,
and thus the analysis below will focus on explaining the distribution of retirements that will
ultimately be observed for this cohort.
V.  Estimates of the Structural Model
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 report the maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters
of the joint utility function and the associated t statistics using data from the Health and
Retirement Study.  Following the methodology reported above, the equations for the status of
each spouse are jointly determined, allowing for the underlying interaction of the decisions of
each spouse in a noncooperative bargaining model.  The estimation searches for the coefficients
of each of the parameters appearing in the utility function(s) and the range of fixed effects that
are most likely to be associated with the retirement outcomes observed for the couple,
conditional on the constraints formed by the wage offer, any pension and social security.  The
dependent variable in the equation for each spouse is an indicator of the work-retirement
decision in each wave of the survey for which the respondent was observed.
We estimate a parsimonious specification of the utility function, with only a few right
hand side variables included in evaluating the utility for each spouse.  First there is  ",  the23The age coefficients in column 3 translate into percentage effects of 85 percent for each
year of age for men, and 70 percent for women; while the coefficients in column 5 translate into
percentage effects of 96 and 108 percent for each year of age for men and women respectively.
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exponent on the measure of joint consumption.  The remaining measures affect the utility of
retirement and are different for each of the spouses.  For each spouse, the measure of age is
continuous, so that no special effects are built into the outcomes through a dummy variable
corresponding to whatever age the retirement hazard happens to spike at.  Spouse’s retirement
status is a qualitative binary variable defined as whether the spouse is contemporaneously
retired. Health status is an indicator equal to one if the respondent has reported in two successive
surveys that health status is fair or poor, or if self reported health status is fair or poor for the last
observed survey. An indicator of vintage (year of birth) is also included. 
The estimated coefficients are similar to those we found in our earlier study (Gustman
and Steinmeier, 2000a), which are reported in column 3 of Table 4, with the associated t
statistics in column 4.  Column 5 reports the coefficients obtained from the expanded sample
from the NLS-MW which also included employer provided pension plan descriptions, or
matched descriptions that involved defined benefit plans with comparable early and normal
retirement dates.
The easiest way to interpret the findings is to begin with the coefficient on the age
measure.  This parameter indicates that roughly speaking, utility of retirement is increasing for
the husband by about 60 percent per year with each year of age (e
.47 -1), and by about 52 percent
per year for the wife (e
.42 -1).  The coefficients on the age variable are lower in the HRS than in
the NLS-MW.
23  That suggests that policies will be found to be more effective when they are
evaluated using utility function parameters from the HRS.  As suggested earlier, the smaller20
effects of age in the HRS may be due to more precise estimation of the pension accrual profile in
the HRS, where pension plan descriptions were exactly matched, in contrast to reliance on crude
pension formulas and self reported plan descriptions as in column 3, or a mix between imputed
and matched plan descriptions, as in column 5.
For the husband, in the results using HRS data, having a retired wife is equivalent to the
effect of being about a year older.  This is similar to our published findings based on the NLS-
MW seen in column 3, and a bit smaller than the NLS-MW results based on employer plan
descriptions, which suggest that having a retired wife is equivalent to about another 1.8 years of
age.  For the wife, having a retired husband is equivalent to about another three quarters of a year
of age, whereas there was almost no effect of having a retired husband in the NLS-MW sample. 
This finding, that in HRS data there is a stronger dependence of the wife’s labor supply on the
husband’s retirement than in NLS-MW data, is in part is traceable to better measurement of the
opportunity set facing the husband in HRS data. Because in the HRS sample, the effect of each
year of age is greater for the husband than the wife, having a retired spouse continues to have a
larger effect for men than for women, but the difference between husbands and wives is
narrower than we found in our earlier work using NLS-MW data. 
In the HRS findings, for the husband the effect of ill health is equivalent to about an
additional 1.5 years of age.  This is considerably less than we found using the NLS-MW self
reported data seen in columns 3 and 4, where poor health is equivalent to about three years of
aging.  For the wife, ill health has the same effect as about another 2.7 years of age, which is
greater than the NLS-MW results, where ill health is equivalent to about another 1.6 years of
age.21
Vintage is also significant, as is the standard deviation of the fixed effects.  The former
result suggests that those in widely different vintages will have considerable differences in taste. 
However, we should note that both the NLS and HRS are focused on a fairly narrow range of
vintages, and extrapolating very far outside this range may be unsound.  As for unobserved
differences in retirement preferences (the fixed effects), it is clear from the magnitude of the
standard deviation of these preferences that variations in taste create a considerable difference in
retirement behavior.
Lastly, the correlation of the fixed effect retirement preferences using the HRS data is
almost identical to the value found in our earlier published data.  This correlation is considerably
weaker in the NLS results with employer provided pension data. 
VI.  Sources of Joint Retirement
In this model, it is difficult to compare directly the coefficients for the spouse retirement
variables with the correlation coefficient for the unobserved part of preferences.  Both the
correlation coefficient and the coefficient of the wife retired variable in the husband’s
preferences are significant, and the coefficient of the husband retired variable in the wife’s
preferences is close to significant.  By themselves, the sizes or even the significance of these
measures do not establish which is more important as a determinant of joint retirement.  To
determine the relative importance of each effect, we conduct simulations of retirement behavior
which include and exclude these effects.
To do the simulations, the procedure is as follows.  The simulations are performed for the
same couples who were used in the estimation, using the same values for the compensation
streams and for the variables in the  X  vector as were used in the estimation.  A random draw is22
made from the bivariate normal distribution of  ,w  and  ,h,  allowing for the standard errors of
the two  ,’s  and their correlation.  This gives the retirement ages of the wife and husband
corresponding to these values of the  ,’s.  This process is repeated 10,000 times for each couple
in the sample.
Table 5 reports on the main results of these simulations for the HRS sample and for each
of the NLS-MW samples.  The fractions of households retiring together in each survey are
reported in row 1 of the table.  A great deal of caution is required in interpreting the results in
row 1.  Specifically, statistics on the baseline level of joint retirements should not be compared
across surveys nor should they necessarily be compared to the simulation results.  According to
row 1 in Table 5, the proportion retiring together is much higher in the HRS than in the NLS-
MW.  But this may be due to two factors which make the numbers in this row to some degree
non-comparable.  First, these figures consider couples to retire together if they retire between the
same two waves.  But the waves are separated by different amounts of time in the two surveys. 
HRS waves are always two years apart.  However, the NLS-MW waves are in some cases only
one year apart.  The longer period between survey waves will make the HRS figures on
coincidence of retirement higher.  Secondly, the percentages in row 1 of Table 5 use in the
denominator only those couples for whom both retirements were observed.  In the HRS, these
cover only four periods between the five waves, while in the NLS-MW they cover a
considerably larger number of waves.  A perhaps more useful comparison across the surveys is
that in the HRS, about three times as many couples retire together as at adjacent cells (see Table
3 above), and this is about the same proportion as in Figure 3 in our previous work using NLS-
MW data (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000a).23
The simulations in the second row of Table 5 are for the full model, and in subsequent
rows for the model with one or another source of interdependence in preferences suppressed.  To
clarify the measure of simultaneous retirement reported in the sample, if the simulation resulted
in the husband retiring in 1994 at age 62 and the wife retiring in 1997 at age 58, the value of this
variable would be -3.  A value of 0 indicates that both spouses retired in the same year.  
In contrast to the results in Row 1 of Table 5, which present the fraction retiring at the
same time in the raw data, consisting only of those who had retired by the time the survey was
taken, the simulations in the other rows of Table 5 report the retirement dates for all couples in
the sample.  Thus the results in rows 2 through 5 adjust for selectivity to incorporate the
retirement dates for those who were not observed to retire by the last year of the survey.  
Row 2 of Table 5 gives the results using the full model, including the spouse retirement
variables and the correlation between unobserved preferences.  In the HRS data, 9% of couples
are simulated to retire in exactly the same year.  Figure 1 shows the simulated distribution of
relative retirement ages.  The spike in the middle of the figure indicates the joint retirement.  The
part of the figure to the right refers to cases where the husband retires first, and the part to the
left refers to cases where the wife retires first.  The figure indicates that the incidence of joint
retirement appears to be almost twice as great as the incidence of retirement one or two years
apart.
Row 5 of Table 5 shows the results of simulations setting to zero the correlation in
unobserved preferences and omitting the spouse retirement variables from the utility functions of24In this simulation, the constant in the linear form  X$  is increased to compensate for
the omission of the spouse retirement variable.  Otherwise, the omission of the spouse retirement
variable would reduce the coefficient of leisure in the utility function and lead to an increase in
retirement ages generally. 
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the two spouses.
24  These results lower the spike at joint retirement to the same level as the
adjacent values in Figure 1 and thus exhibit no evidence of joint retirement.  Note that this
simulation eliminates any preferences for joint retirement, but does not eliminate incentives for
joint retirement that operate through the opportunity set.  For instance, if couples tended to
choose jobs that had the same early retirement date in their pensions, the pensions might still
induce a tendency toward joint retirement even if the couples otherwise had no particular
preferences towards retiring at about the same time.  This simulation, however, effectively rules
out the possibility that a significant proportion of joint retirement arises because of coordinated
retirement incentives in the compensation profiles.
The other two simulations reported in Table 5 examine separately the omission of the
spouse retirement variables and setting the correlation of the unobserved preferences to zero. 
Row 3 omits the spouse retirement variables but keeps the correlation at the value found in the
last row of Table 4.  The correlation parameter has almost no effect on joint retirement.  In
contrast, when in row 4 we include the spouse retirement variables but omit the correlation, the
spouse retirement variables alone account for almost all of the spike in joint retirement that is
evident in the full model.
VII.  Including A Direct Measure of Spouse Preferences for Joint Retirement
To further explore the role of preferences for joint retirement, we include a direct
measure of the desire of each spouse to retire with the other.  The Health and Retirement Study25
asked each respondent how much being with the other spouse is a positive point of retirement
(questions K11d and K21d).  This variable is defined to have a value of 1 if the respondent said
that being with the spouse was a “very important” benefit of retirement.  About half the
respondents gave this response to the question.  In the expanded model, the new variable is
entered in the linear form  $X  as  ... + $e (spouse retired) (enjoy time with spouse) + ....   This
has the effect of splitting the old coefficient of spouse retired into a part dependent on the new
enjoy spouse variable and a remaining effect.  
The model estimates with the new variable are presented in Table 6.  This new variable
picks up almost all of the effect of the original spouse retirement variable for wives, and around
half for husbands.  The effect is stronger for husbands than wives, and we still find that the
husbands disproportionately prefer to have their wives retire with or before them.  The wife’s
parameter is significant at the 92% confidence level, and both variables are jointly significant at
the 98% confidence level.  Figure 2 indicates the relative retirement distributions implied by
these results.  Compared to Figure 1, this indicator of preference for joint retirement leads to a
substantial increase in the share of joint retirements, from about 9 percent to almost 16 percent. 
Moreover, joint retirement now is about three times more common than retirement at adjacent
values, which more closely approximates the retirement observed in Table 3B.
Table 7 reports the effects of the decomposition as to the reason for joint retirement when
the “enjoy spouse in retirement” measure is included with the preference variables.  Once again,
virtually all of the explanation for joint retirements resides with the spouse retirement coefficient
rather than with the correlation in preferences.
VIII.  Simulating the Effects of Alternative Rules for Sharing Benefits Within the26
Household 
Policy makers are concerned with the rules governing the sharing of social security
benefits between spouses.  Under current provisions, when both spouses are alive each spouse is
entitled to an amount equal to approximately half the benefits earned by the other, or to benefits
based on own earnings, whichever is larger.  When one dies, the other will receive either the
survivor benefit (equal to the benefit the deceased was entitled to with some adjustment for early
claiming), or the benefit based on their own earnings, whichever is larger.  It can be shown that,
because of the progressivity of the social security benefit formula, a lower earning spouse will
have all benefits received while their spouse is alive based on own earnings if, very roughly, the
AIME from own earnings is one third or more of the AIME of the high earning spouse.  That is,
one third of the AIME results in half of the higher earning spouse’s PIA.  
The incentive to continue to work depends in part on the marginal reward to continued
work.  Part of the marginal reward consists of any increase in social security benefits associated
with an additional year of work.  This, in turn, depends in a fairly complex way on whether the
spouse is the higher or lower earning spouse, whether the spouses are currently eligible for
benefits, and relative difference between the earnings amounts.  At one extreme, an individual
over 65 who is collecting spouse benefits would, by working, be giving up current benefits with
no increase in future benefits at all.  At the other extreme, an individual whose spouse has very
low earnings can increase not only his or her own benefits, but also the spouse and potential
survivor benefits of the spouse, by working an additional year.  There are may cases in between
these extremes.  For instance, if both spouses are collecting benefits based on own earnings, an
additional year of work by the lower income spouse will increase the future benefits of that27
spouse, but only as long as the other spouse is alive.
The model we have estimated is structural and as a result allows us to isolate the effects
both of current law and of alternative policies governing the crediting of benefits within the
household.  Some schemes for sharing benefits among spouses, including schemes that would
simply divide credit for total earnings in a household evenly between the two spouses, will
change the incentives for continued work for each spouse.  A policy that would split the credit
for earnings by either spouse evenly between both of them would increase the reward for work at
older ages.  For the higher income spouse, the reason is that after calculating the average indexed
monthly earnings (AIME), a person’s benefit in 2001is 90 percent of the first $6,732 of
annualized AIME, 32 percent of the next $33,840, and 15% of the remainder of AIME up to
maximum covered earnings.  When benefits are jointly credited, this spouse is more likely to be
in the 90 percent bracket rather than the 32 percent bracket or the 32 percent bracket rather than
the 15 percent bracket, and this will make benefits respond more strongly with increased
earnings from further work.  The lower earning spouse may also see an increased incentive to
work if he or she would collect spouse benefits under the current system.  Under the current
system, increased work by such an individual generates no increase in future benefits at all,
whereas with a scheme to split the earnings credit, increased work by the lower income spouse
would generate increased benefits for both spouses.
As with earnings splitting, private accounts accrue benefits more evenly over the lifetime
than under the current 90, 32, 15 percent brackets, again raising the reward to work later in life
relative to the current system.  The flatter accruals mean that the rewards for working later are
relatively higher than the rewards to working in the early years, and this should delay retirement. 25Note that whether or not the benefit is annuitized at retirement is irrelevant in this
model, since the only thing that matters in the model is the expected present value of the accrual. 
This also means that any liquidity effects are not accounted for.  Thus these findings are not the
same as those that would be observed were liquidity constraints included in the model. 
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In addition to the work incentives, either earnings splitting or private accounts will
redistribute benefits away from families where one spouse is the primary earner.  Under the
current system, a family where one spouse is the primary earner will collect more benefits,
including spouse and survivor benefits, than will a family with the same total income but where
the two spouses earn more nearly equal amounts.  In other words, the current system
redistributes benefits toward families where one spouse is the primary earner, and this
redistribution would be nullified under either of the two alternatives.  However, note that this
does not mean that a family with two workers is as well off as a family with a single worker
earning the same total amount, since the financial calculations do not value the leisure of the stay
at home spouse.
Table 8 presents cumulative retirement probabilities by age from retirement simulations
under three different programs.  The first two columns present results under the current program. 
In the next two columns, the results are simulated for a program where the accruals are simply
equal to the contributions.  This corresponds roughly to a situation where the entire amount is
placed in a private account and allowed to grow at the interest rate.
25  In the last two columns,
the results pertain to a program where there is simple earnings splitting.  That is, credited
earnings are divided equally between the husband and wife each year.  
Table 8B presents simulations based on the model in which each respondent indicates
how much they value being with their spouse in retirement, whereas Table 8A runs the same29
simulations where the indicator of spouse retirement status influences each spouse’s valuation of
retirement, but the variable indicating the valuation of spending time with one’s spouse in
retirement is missing.
As seen in Tables 8A, these alternative programs reduce the ranks of the retired by one to
two percentage points.  At age 55 men are about eight tenths of a percentage point less likely to
have retired under a privatized system or one where credit for working is evenly split between
spouses than under the current system.  Wives are almost two percentage points less likely to
have retired by age 55 under the alternative systems.  By age 60 and 62, men are about 1.5
percentage points less likely to be retired under the alternative systems.  Wives are two to three
percentage points less likely to have retired under the alternative system.  Smaller differences are
found at age 65.  With half the male labor force retired by age 62 and more than two thirds of the
female labor force retired, these one to two percentage point differences in the share of the
population retired translate into more than a two to four percent increase in the labor force
around age 62.  By age 65, given the lower base in number working, an almost two percentage
point difference in the proportion retired translates into roughly a six percent increase in the size
of the male labor force, and a 1.5 percentage point difference in the proportion retired translates
into almost a 14 percent increase in the number of women working.  Even when account is taken
of the preference for having the spouse jointly retired, the implications of these two alternative
programs are roughly the same as before, as is indicated in Table 8B.
To summarize, comparing outcomes between the two programs, the bigger increase in
work effort is found under the private accounts plan rather than under the plan in which earnings
are split between spouses. 30
IX.  Conclusions
At the outset of this paper we emphasized the potential importance of having employer
provided plan descriptions for identification of the factors shaping each spouse’s retirement
decision within the household.  We find that key parameters are estimated with much greater
precision when employer provided pension plan descriptions are matched for a large share of the
pension covered workers.  To be sure, we obtain the same qualitative message whether employer
provided plan descriptions are available or not.  Interdependence in retirement is due the
appearance of spouse’s retirement status in the preferences of both the husband and wife.  But
there is evidence of stronger interdependence in preferences with the improved HRS data, and
the suggestion that social security policies changing the relative rewards to work by each spouse
will have a larger effect on retirement outcomes.  In addition, when labor supply histories are
reported independently by each spouse, as they are in the HRS, we also obtain an improved
understanding of retirement decision making within the household. 
Using a measure of how much each spouse values being able to spend time in retirement
with the other, we find that this direct measure of preferences accounts for much of the apparent
interdependence in retirement within the household.  When we include this measure, the
simulations double the frequency of predicted joint retirements.  Moreover, the wife’s
interdependence is due entirely to the difference between those who value spending time in
retirement with their spouse and those who do not.  Although it also remains true that husbands
are more influenced by whether their spouse is retired than wives are, half the effect for the
husband reflects whether he enjoys the idea of spending time in retirement with his wife.
Policy alternatives that would privatize social security, or divide benefits between31
spouses encourage work at older ages. Compared to the current system, these policies will have a
limited but not trivial effect on retirement outcomes.  Due to the greater precision in estimating
preference parameters with HRS data, the effects of age on retirement preferences are
substantially lower in this paper than in our earlier work.  This is particularly important because
the responsiveness of retirement to the incentives created by pension and social security policies
is greater the lower the coefficient on the age measure in the preference function.  Thus we are
better able to distinguish the retirement effects of changes in the allocation of benefits within the
household under the social security changes.  We find these effects to be noteworthy.  At some
ages, such as 65, there may be as much as a 6 percent increase in the old age work force under
privatized accounts compared to the current social security program.32
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Table 1
Reasons for deletions of observations from the HRS Sample
Observations Observations
Deleted Remaining
Couples with both spouses interviewed 4767
Changed spouses after age 35 1424 3343
Not both career workers 1876 1467
Age not consistent among surveys 143 1324
Social security status ambiguous 24 1300
Number of full-time years ambiguous 116 1184
Earnings unclear from SS record alone 7 1177
No Pension Provider record in last job 462 71536
Table 2
Retirement Tabulations From the HRS by Year

















  Before 1992 107 43 37 25 27 45 284
  1992-1994 26 59 15 19 15 29 163
  1994-1996 24 21 46 21 21 40 173
  1996-1998 22 17 27 53 24 36 179
  1998-2000 26 8 17 25 47 69 192
  After 2000 30 28 34 40 49 295 476
Sum of Wives 235 176 176 183 183 514 1467

















  Before 1992 48 19 19 12 11 29 138
  1992-1994 13 24 8 12 9 14 80
  1994-1996 10 4 14 8 11 26 73
  1996-1998 10 7 13 25 10 14 79
  1998-2000 10 3 9 12 23 39 96
  After 2000 12 16 18 24 23 156 249
Sum of Wives 103 73 81 93 87 278 71537
Table 3
Retirement Differences Between Husbands and Wives In The HRS Among Couples
Who Have Already Retired, By Age Difference Between Husband and Wife
A.  Including Observations With Missing Budget Constraint Data
                   Difference in Retirement Surveys (Husband - Wife)
A g e  D i f f e r e n c e- 3 - 2 - 10123 S u m
Husband - Wife
- 1 0 0001000 1
- 9 0000000 0
- 8 0000000 0
- 7 0001000 1
- 6 0001000 1
- 5 0011000 2
- 4 0002000 2
- 3 0004100 5
- 2 1016210 1 1
- 1 123 1 2530 2 6
0 123 1 7940 3 6
1 118 2 6831 4 8
2 361 2 4 1 252 5 3
3 07 1 1 2 1861 5 4
4 26 1 1 2 5821 5 5
5 183 1 3431 3 3
6 207 1 0501 2 5
7 015 1 4450 2 9
8 100 1 1210 1 5
9 1425300 1 5
1 0 134 1 1211 2 3
Sum 15 40 60 205 73 34 8 43538
Table 3
Retirement Differences Between Husbands and Wives In The HRS Among Couples
Who Have Already Retired, By Age Difference Between Husband and Wife
B.  Excluding Observations With Missing Budget Constraint Data
                  
Difference in Retirement Surveys (Husband - Wife)
A g e  D i f f e r e n c e- 3 - 2 - 10123 S u m
Husband - Wife
- 1 0 0000000 0
- 9 0000000 0
- 8 0000000 0
- 7 0001000 1
- 6 0000000 0
- 5 0010000 1
- 4 0001000 1
- 3 0002000 2
- 2 0015210 9
- 1 0107110 1 0
0 1107520 1 6
1 116 1 1310 2 3
2 2318631 2 4
3 0478341 2 7
4 156 1 5310 3 1





1 0 1305100 1 0
Sum 9 23 26 86 29 16 3 19239
Table 4
Parameter Estimates for a Structural Model
HRS NLS-MW
Self Reported Pensions 
NLS-MW
Firm Reported Pensions
coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
Joint consumption exponent -0.59 -2.7 -1.53 -4.0 -1.21 -3.4
Husband's parameters
  Constant -10.18 -12.0 -20.03 -15.7 -18.34 13.9
  Age
a 0.47 4.8 0.61 4.1 0.68 4.4
  Wife’s Retirement 0.50 2.2 0.58 1.1 1.19 2.9
  Health 0.72 2.3 2.05 3.7 1.88 3.7
  Vintage
b 0.11 2.7 0.11 2.3 0.12 2.6
  Std. dev. of fixed effects 2.75 5.5 3.41 3.4 3.51 5.0
Wife's parameters
  Constant -9.23 -17.0 -18.62 -26.8 -17.28 -16.6
  Age
a 0.42 5.3 0.53 5.2 0.73 4.3
  Husband’s Retirement 0.31 1.7 0.10 0.3 0.00 —
c
  Health 1.12 3.4 0.98 3.1 1.05 2.5
  Vintage
b 0.12 3.5 0.08 2.0 0.11 2.4
  Std. dev. of fixed effects 2.35 5.8 2.71 5.8 3.56 4.7
Correlation of fixed effects 0.24 4.2 0.24 4.1 0.09 1.5
Number of Observations 715 564 449
Log likelihood -1776.50 -1394.47 -1545.24
Age is measured at the time of each survey.  An individual is retired if not working full-time with no
further observations of full-time work.  Health equals one if in two consecutive surveys (or in the last
observed survey) self-reported health is fair or poor.
a.  The actual age variable is the observed age minus 55.  This is done to facilitate the maximization
routine, and it has no implications for the estimates other than affecting the constant terms in the linear
forms.
b.  The actual vintage is the year of birth minus 1930 for the NLS, and the year of birth minus 1936 for
the HRS.
c.  In the wife’s retirement equation in column 5, the coefficient for the variable indicating the husband
is retired is constrained to be zero.40
Table 5

















Without Rho 0.08 0.10 0.14
Without Both Spouse
  Retirement and Rho
0.05 0.04 0.06
a. Results for raw data include only those observations where both spouses retired by the last
wave of the survey.  Results estimated with model adjust for selection and include those retiring
after the age range observed for the survey.
b. When the spouse retirement variable is set equal to zero, the constants are increased so as not
cause an increase in the average retirement age.  
c.  Computed from Table 3B as 86/192.41
Table 6
The Structural Model Estimated With HRS Data
Including A Measure of Enjoyment of One’s Spouse
coefficient t-statistic
Joint consumption exponent -0.58 -2.7
Husband's parameters
  Constant -10.02 -11.8
  Age 0.45 4.7
  Wife’s Retirement 0.53 2.0
  Wife’s Retirement*Enjoy Time With Wife 0.34 1.2
  Health 0.71 2.3
  Vintage 0.09 2.5
  Std. dev. of fixed effects 2.69 5.4
Wife's parameters
  Constant -9.10 -16.7
  Age 0.42 5.3
  Husband’s Retirement 0.06 0.3
  Husband’s Retirement*Enjoy Time With Husband 0.52 2.2
  Health 1.07 3.3
  Vintage 0.12 3.4
  Std. dev. of fixed effects 2.36 0.4
Correlation of fixed effects 0.19 3.3
Number of Observations 715
Log likelihood -1772.392242
Table 7
Proportion of HRS Households With Husband and Wife Retiring Together
HRS Without “Enjoy
Spouse”Variable






Full Model 0.09 0.16
Without Spouse Retirement
b 0.05 0.05
Without Rho 0.08 0.15
Without Both Spouse
  Retirement and Rho
0.05 0.05
a. Results for raw data include only those observations where both spouses retired by the last
wave of the survey.  Results estimated with model adjust for selection and include those retiring
after the age range observed for the survey.
b. When the spouse retirement variable is set equal to zero, the constants are increased so as not
cause an increase in the average retirement age.  
c.  Computed from Table 3 as 205/435.43
Table 8
Effects of Alternative Social Security Schemes on Cumulative Retirements by Age
A.  Model Without Enjoy Spouse Variable
Current System Private Accounts Divide Earnings
age husband wife husband wife husband wife
50 1.3 6.9 1.2 5.9 1.1 5.6
51 2.1 9.4 1.8 8.2 1.8 7.9
52 3.2 12.3 2.8 10.9 2.9 10.6
53 4.7 15.9 4.2 14.4 4.2 14.1
54 6.6 20.4 6.0 18.6 6.1 18.4
55 9.5 25.8 8.7 23.8 8.8 23.7
56 12.9 31.5 11.9 29.4 12.1 29.4
57 17.2 38.0 16.0 35.9 16.2 36.0
58 22.5 45.2 21.2 43.1 21.4 43.3
59 28.8 52.2 27.3 50.1 27.6 50.4
60 36.2 59.7 34.5 57.8 34.9 58.1
61 43.4 66.6 41.7 64.9 42.1 65.3
62 50.9 74.0 49.1 71.6 49.6 72.0
63 58.3 79.7 56.6 77.6 57.1 78.0
64 65.4 84.7 63.8 83.0 64.7 83.3
65 72.7 89.1 70.9 87.5 72.4 88.1
66 78.6 92.2 77.0 90.9 78.6 91.6
67 84.0 94.6 82.4 93.6 84.0 94.2
68 88.3 96.3 86.9 95.6 88.4 96.2
69 91.7 97.6 90.5 97.1 91.7 97.5
70 93.6 98.2 93.3 98.1 93.4 98.244
Table 8
Effects of Alternative Social Security Schemes on Cumulative Retirements by Age
B.  Model With Enjoy Spouse Variable
Current System Private Accounts Divide Earnings
age husband wife husband wife husband wife
50 1.4 6.6 1.3 5.9 1.3 5.7
51 2.2 9.2 2.0 8.2 2.0 7.9
52 3.3 12.1 3.0 10.9 3.0 10.7
53 4.8 15.7 4.3 14.4 4.3 14.1
54 6.8 20.2 6.2 18.6 6.2 18.4
55 9.7 25.6 8.9 23.8 8.9 23.7
56 13.2 31.3 12.1 29.4 12.3 29.4
57 17.5 37.9 16.3 35.9 16.4 36.0
58 22.9 45.0 21.4 42.9 21.7 43.1
59 29.3 52.0 27.7 49.9 28.0 50.2
60 36.8 59.5 35.0 57.5 35.4 57.9
61 44.1 66.0 42.2 64.6 42.7 65.0
62 51.8 73.8 49.8 71.3 50.3 71.7
63 59.4 79.5 57.4 77.4 58.1 77.8
64 66.5 84.5 64.6 82.7 65.6 83.0
65 74.0 89.0 72.1 87.2 73.7 87.9
66 79.7 92.1 77.9 90.7 79.5 91.4
67 85.1 94.5 83.4 93.4 85.0 94.1
68 89.2 96.3 87.7 95.5 89.1 96.0
69 92.5 97.6 91.2 96.9 92.4 97.4
70 94.2 98.1 93.8 98.0 94.0 98.145
Figure 1
Distribution of Differences in Retirement Dates Between Husband and Wife
Using the Model without the “Enjoy Spouse Retirement” Variable46
Figure 2
Distribution of Differences in Retirement Dates Between Husband and Wife
Using the Model with the “Enjoy Spouse Retirement” Variable